The families of six American soldiers killed in a drone strike in Kuwait are demanding answers — saying commanders ignored warnings that the site was vulnerable, and that the wounded were failed twice: first before the attack, then in its aftermath.
The March 1 Iranian drone strike at Port Shuaiba, south of Kuwait City, killed six soldiers and wounded dozens in the deadliest known attack on U.S. troops since Operation Epic Fury began on February 28. An Associated Press investigation published Friday, based on interviews with 13 soldiers and several Gold Star families, found that many of the wounded — some with decades of service — say commanders had been warned the facility, a rectangular building with wooden sides at a working seaport, was particularly vulnerable to a drone strike.
That warning went unheeded, the soldiers say. Some also said higher-ranking officers pushed for an all-clear to be called, moving troops out of nearby bunkers. About 20 minutes after the final all-clear, an Iranian drone smashed through the operations center's roof.
"We have the right to know what really happened," Tina Marzan, widow of Chief Warrant Officer 3 Robert Marzan — who served 36 years — told the AP. "If somebody messed up, those people need to be held responsible."
The six who died: Maj. Cody Khork, 35; Master Sgt. Noah L. Tietjens, 42; Maj. Jeffrey R. O'Brien, 45, a father of three; Master Sgt. Nicole M. Amor, 39, a mother of two; Sgt. Declan J. Coady, 20; and Marzan, 54. Four received posthumous promotions.
But the Army's side of the story is more complicated than the families' account suggests. The Army declined to comment on the AP's specific findings, saying it has not yet briefed the families on the outcome of its own investigation into the attack, which was completed in June but has not been released pending redactions.
"Out of respect for the primary next of kin who will be scheduled for briefs on the official findings of the completed investigation, we will not comment on specific details, individual accounts, or leaked portions of the report at this time," the Army said in a statement.
And in a significant counterpoint, the Army's inspector general concluded in a July 20 letter that Brig. Gen. Clint Barnes — one of the two generals overseeing the deployment — had not engaged in misconduct or "ignored reliable intelligence," based on the evidence provided.
Others defend the commanders' decisions as the brutal arithmetic of war. One enlisted soldier told the AP the command team faces "unfair criticism for hard decisions to balance its ability to carry out a crucial logistics mission with the inherent risks of war." Lt. Col. Arturo Lincón, who was wounded in the attack, said staying at the port "seemed appropriate" given its existing secure communications infrastructure. The generals were following orders from Army Central and Central Command, and neither was empowered to change the site's air defenses.
The wounded also describe a chaotic medical aftermath — some used Google to find local hospitals, and a group sent to Germany's Landstuhl medical center says they were housed in barracks rather than admitted. The Pentagon responded that Landstuhl's mission is to stabilize patients for transfer to U.S. military hospitals, and that all wounded troops are evaluated and admitted based on injury severity.
In early July, Gold Star families received a briefing from Lt. Gen. Patrick Frank on the investigation's broad findings. Marzan said there was no admission of error.
Eight months into the war, with 19 U.S. personnel killed and more than 800 wounded, the Port Shuaiba families are still waiting for the full accounting they were promised.